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The views presented in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the official view of the New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries.     1 
Introduction 
The year 2006 marked the twentieth anniversary of the introduction of the Quota 
Management System (QMS) in New Zealand fisheries management.  This major 
institutional change made individual transferable quota (ITQ) the quantitative 
authority for commercial fisheries catches, leading structural change and economic 
development to transform the New Zealand fishing industry into a prosperous and 
major contributor to the national economy. 
In addition to being a significant anniversary for the QMS, last year also saw 
significant development of a new objectives-based co-management framework by 
the Ministry of Fisheries.  Created to build on the strengths of the QMS, the new 
approach seeks to establish a hierarchy of specified objectives for fisheries 
management – from overall statements of desired outcomes through to detailed 
standards for processes and management performance – explicitly linked through 
stated intervention logic.  Working to this set of objectives and standards, an 
agency-facilitated stakeholder process will develop agreed management plans for 
defined fisheries.  Objectives must be measurable and linkages testable, with 
monitoring of specified performance indicators being integral components of agreed 
plans.   
The new Fisheries Plan framework capitalises on the coherence brought to the 
commercial sector by secure catching rights under the QMS, attempting to extend 
this across the broader stakeholder community.  It is endeavouring to establish a new 
process model for agency-initiated co-management that has the potential to draw 
diverse stakeholders together and develop common goals for management of their 
fisheries.   
After providing a brief introduction to the New Zealand context and the QMS and its 
history, this paper sets out to assess how the QMS has performed against the 
assumptions that underpinned its implementation in the mid-1980s.  This in turn 
provides the context for the next step – the development of the Fisheries Plan 
framework – envisioned to move the overall management system in New Zealand 
forward into an era of broader stewardship of resources and environment, by all 
fisheries stakeholders. This new framework and the progress thus far are briefly 
described.   
New Zealand Fisheries: Context  
New Zealand’s fisheries resources are only moderately abundant in international 
terms.    The  estimated  maximum  sustainable  yield  for  the  4.1m  km
2  Exclusive 
Economic  Zone  (EEZ)  (see  Figure  1),  declared  in  1978,  is  something  over  six 
hundred  thousand  tonnes,  with  about  one  third  of  the  zone  fishable  by  modern 
demersal methods.   2 
As in other coastal states, the declaration of the EEZ was driven in part by fishing of 
the area by distant water fleets of other nations, in New Zealand particularly from 
Japan, Korea and the USSR.  This foreign exploitation of what are now considered 
New Zealand fish-stocks had begun in the 1950s when the domestic industry was 
highly regulated.  The government response was to completely deregulate fishing in 
1963 and to provide subsidies and other encouragement for the domestic industry to 
compete  for  a  larger  share  of  the  catch.    The  industry  responded  with  a  vessel 
building boom and a rapid increase in catches from the inshore fisheries.  However, 
the foreign fleets also increased their efforts, and by 1977 were taking nearly 90% of 
the 476,000 tonne known fin-fish catch from the area (Sharp 1997).   
 
 
Figure 1 - New Zealand Exclusive Economic Zone, showing the 10 
Fisheries Management Areas 
 
Responsibility for the management of New Zealand’s fisheries lay with the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries.
1  Initially, following the declaration of the EEZ, the 
fisheries outside the twelve-mile Territorial Sea were managed separately.  Total 
allowable  catches  (TACs)  were  struck  for  the  offshore  species,  and  these  were 
allocated preferentially to the domestic industry, and secondly to the foreign fleets 
under  licence  and  government  bilateral  agreements.    These  policies  offered  the 
foreign fleets less of the prime species and areas than they had been fishing before 
                                                 
1 The Fisheries Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was reformed in 1995 as the 
Ministry of Fisheries.       3 
1978.  This changed the economic balance and resulted in a much reduced total 
catch for the next few years (OECD 1997).   
Government policies at this time also provided incentives for domestic companies to 
invest in onshore processing plants and vessels for offshore fishing, but the main 
initial  domestic  involvement  was  developed  through  joint  ventures  with  foreign 
companies and foreign vessel charter.  Joint ventures brought local crew onto the big 
vessels and direct involvement of domestic companies in the management of fishing 
operations and marketing, paving the way for further domestic expansion. Foreign 
vessels began delivering large catches for onshore processing.  By about 1982 local 
companies  had  learnt  what  they  needed  to  know  from  joint  ventures,  and 
arrangements  with  foreign  vessels  moved  to  simpler  contracts  to  charter  fishing 
capacity  to  catch  against  domestic  company  quotas.    Foreign  vessel  charter  has 
remained  an  important  part  of  offshore  fishing  in  New  Zealand  since  that  time, 
gradually  diminishing  as  domestic  companies  have  invested  in  large  freezer 
trawlers.  Both arrangements brought greatly increased cash flow to the domestic 
industry, foreign exchange from exports, and employment in processing.   
At  the  same  time  that  the  offshore  fisheries  were  being  domesticated,  New 
Zealand’s  inshore  fisheries  began  showing  signs  of  stress,  and  management 
gradually moved into crisis mode.  New powers to declare controlled fisheries were 
introduced in 1977 and a moratorium on scallop and rock lobster permits followed 
in  1978.    Alarming  fluctuations  in  catches  of  the  most  economically  important 
inshore  species,  snapper  (Pagrus  auratus),  and  rapidly  increasing  catches  of 
vulnerable species of sharks and gropers, brought a total fishing permit moratorium 
in 1982.  Both management and industry had recognised that there were economic as 
well as stock problems in the inshore fisheries (Riley 1982).  Five per cent of the 
fleet was taking two thirds of the catch, and there were large numbers of part time 
operators.   
Introduction of ITQs 
During 1983 a consultative policy review process was initiated by the Ministry for 
the  inshore  fisheries,  and  a  trial  “enterprise  allocation”  (EA)  quota  scheme  was 
introduced  in  the  offshore  fisheries.    After  several  rounds  of  consultation  and  a 
change of government, a decision was made in 1985 to adopt a near-comprehensive 
ITQ  based  management  system  for  both  inshore  and  offshore  sectors.    For  the 
offshore, existing EA quotas were converted to ITQ directly.  For the inshore, a 
complex process of assessment and allocation was undertaken.
2  Initial allocations of 
entitlement  were  based  on  catch  histories  from  the  best  two  of  three  qualifying 
years,  and  a  tendering  process  was  undertaken  for  reduction  of  total  allocations 
through a government funded quota buy-back.  Where reduction targets were not 
met  for  critical  species,  administrative  reductions  were  made  to  establish  the 
required TACs.
3 
                                                 
2 The basis of the QMS is described in Clark, I.N. and Duncan 1986, and Clark, I.N., et al. 1988. 
3 Under the New Zealand quota management system, TACs are set for overall take of a fish stock, 
including recreational and indigenous customary fishing.  The commercial catch limit is a subset of the 
TAC and is known as the total allowable commercial catch or TACC.   4 
New Zealand ITQs came into effect in October 1986 applying to 153 management 
stocks of 26 species – the nine off-shore species under EAs, plus 17 inshore species.  
Catches from these species at the time comprised some 83% by weight of the total 
commercial fin-fish catch.  Allocations were subject to appeal to a quasi-judicial 
Quota Appeal Authority, but this did not affect the full operation of the management 
system or quota trading.   
ITQs were created as a perpetual right to a part of the fish harvest, designated in 
absolute weights of whole fish (in metric tonnes) for a particular species or species 
group to be taken annually from a specified quota management area.  These rights 
were allocated free of charge to existing participants in the fisheries, and were to be 
fully compensable in the event of TAC reductions.  Free transferability and lease 
was  subject  to  reporting  of  all  transactions  with  prices  to  the  Ministry,  and  to 
aggregation limits of 20% for inshore and 35% for deep-water stocks.  The ITQ 
allocated rights to utilise the resources, but the fishing permit remained as the right 
of access.  Under the QMS legislation, a fishing permit was to be granted to anyone 
who fulfilled the minimum quota holdings requirement of 5 tonnes for finfish.   
Responsibilities attached to quota ownership included legal obligations to land all 
catch of quota species, unless under minimum legal size; to submit monthly quota 
monitoring reports in addition to completing catch and landing returns and catch-
effort logs for each fishing trip; and to pay resource rentals on all quota held whether 
caught or not.  Some flexibility was built into the system by allowing the carry-over 
of up to 10% of uncaught quota to the following year, or for up to 10% over-catch of 
holdings to be counted against the following year’s entitlements. 
These characteristics established the character of the ITQ as private property in the 
right to harvest fish from a given stock – not in the fish stocks themselves – and a 
clear understanding of this character has become generalised in New Zealand since 
1986.  There was no legal impediment to the use of ITQ as security for bank loans, 
but  the  Ministry  did  not  make  provision  for  the  registration  of  liens  or  caveats 
against the title to ownership, and this in many cases prevented such use.   
Change in the QMS  
The  nature  of  the  ITQ  right  underwent  a  major  change  in  1990.    The  original 
specification of ITQs in tonnes of fish required the government to enter the quota 
market to buy or sell quota when it wished to alter the total allowable catch.  In the 
late  1980s  the  system  faced  the  potential  for  stock  collapse  in  orange  roughy 
(Hoplostethus  atlanticus)  and  the  need  to  reduce  this  valuable  quota  by  large 
percentages.    Under  these  pressures  the  system  was  changed  so  that  ITQs  were 
denominated as a percentage of the total allowable commercial catch (TACC), rather 
than as a specific tonnage.  Adjustment then implied merely the automatic pro rata 
adjustment of all ITQ holdings at the beginning of each season to match the TACC.  
This transferred the risks and benefits of fluctuations in fish stock size from the 
Government to quota owners. 
Further change followed as the resource rental charges on quota were dropped in 
favour of a management cost recovery regime introduced in 1994.  A new Fisheries 
Act  in  1996  foreshadowed  a  range  of  modifications  to  the  system.    The  most 
significant  included  the  division  of  the  quota  right  into  two  separate  entities, 
although this was not implemented until 2001.  An Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE)     5 
– the currency to cover catch in a specific year – was separated from the perpetual 
right to receive a share of the annual catch.  ACE is specified in kilograms of catch 
for a particular stock, while the perpetual ITQ right is now denominated in quota 
shares – of which there are 100 million for each stock. 
Expectations of Quota Management 
The  Quota  Management  System  (QMS)  introduced  in  1986  has  its  roots  in  the 
economic literature of the 1970s, although the fundamental issues were identified 
much earlier (Gordon 1954, Scott 1955).  Gordon’s bioeconomic analysis showed 
why participants in ungoverned open access fisheries were generally poor.  As long 
as there is a profit to be made, effort will enter the fishery.  Additional fishers and 
effort increase the catching costs for everyone until total costs equal total revenue.  
Often, labour costs get discounted in the hope that things will get better again in the 
future. In many cases, along the way the fisheries become depleted below maximum 
productivity as well, sometimes collapsing entirely.   
Controlling escalation of fishing effort directly has proved very difficult due to its 
many dimensions.  The alternative of directly restricting output from fisheries had 
not fared much better until the idea of individual “fisherman quotas” was suggested 
(Christy 1973).  This was developed rapidly into a blueprint for a new management 
approach (Maloney and Pearse 1979).   
This new approach offered hard limits on extractions from fish stocks, and means to 
account for these on an individual fisher-by-fisher basis.  Quantified catching rights 
totalling the desired level of harvest are issued to individual fishers.  Assuming the 
individual limits can be enforced, the total quota on issue can be restricted to prevent 
escalation of effort and the subsequent dissipation of rents and over-exploitation of 
stocks.   
Transferability  of  quota  enables  future  rents  to  be  capitalised  into  the  exchange 
value,  and  gives  quota  owners  a  financial  stake  in  the  future  well-being  of  the 
fishery.  This is often portrayed as a clear incentive for stewardship of the resource 
by quota owners, but is in fact subject to dynamic considerations.  Important among 
these is the growth rate of the fishery biomass with respect to the discount rate, 
which,  if  low,  can  make  it  economically  rational  to  treat  a  fishery  as  a  non-
renewable resource – that is, to mine it to commercial extinction.  Likewise, there 
are  many  factors  bearing  on  individuals  and  firms  that  may  increase  personal 
discount rates to produce a similar effect.  So, ITQ should not be expected to turn 
cowboys into stewards in all cases.  However, a general expectation remains that 
quota  ownership  should  engender  more  responsible  attitudes  toward  stock 
sustainability  and  a  realisation  that  stakeholder  participation  in  fisheries 
management is important and necessary. 
The ability to trade catching rights in a market also offers the potential for owners to 
compare the value they are obtaining from their asset to the market value.  This 
tends  to  drive  allocative  efficiency  by  encouraging  quota to  move  to  those  who 
value  it  the  highest.    This  may  be  through  having  the  lowest  catching  costs,  or 
(perhaps  more  realistically)  through  greater  opportunities  to  capture  downstream 
rents.  These may arise through scale economies and reduced transaction costs from 
vertical  integration  of  catching,  processing,  marketing  and  distribution  in  large 
firms. 6 
Prices  also  serve  as  indicators  of  possibilities  for  improvement  of  productive 
efficiency  in  existing  operations  and  can  drive  innovation  to  lower  costs  and 
improve returns.  The limitation of entitlements to catch and land fish means that 
individuals can concentrate their efforts on improving returns per kilo rather than on 
maximising catch in a race for fish.  At a fleet and fishery level, such efforts can be 
expected to result in some rationalisation of capital assets – particularly vessels, but 
also  in  processing  capacity,  and  this  rationalisation  is  likely  to  have  impacts  on 
employment. 
ITQs were implemented in New Zealand in the context of the effort to convert the 
deepwater fisheries from foreign to domestically prosecuted, or at least for rents to 
be retained within New Zealand.  This required the local industry participants to 
make large investments and take significant commercial risks.  The quota system 
provided  both  security  and  flexibility  for  firms  to  invest  in  the  fisheries.    In 
particular it enabled the use of distant water fishing nation vessels under charter to 
local companies holding quota. 
In  1986,  many  thought  the  ITQ  system  was  the  long-term  solution  to  fisheries 
management  issues.    However,  some  of  the  architects  of  the  ITQ  programme 
considered  it  an  interim  step  to  deal  with  immediate  fisheries  issues  and  a  step 
towards  the  significantly  increased  self-management  by  quota  owners  that  they 
considered  important  for  long-term  management.    The  desirability  of  devolved 
management was debated in the late 1980s and into the 1990s with Pearse (1991), 
the  Task  Force  (Wheeler  1992),  and  Independent  Reviewer  (Hartevelt  1998)  all 
contributing  to  the  debate.    Many  fishers  initially  viewed  the  suggestion  as  the 
government shirking its responsibilities to provide management, but over time the 
logic of the potential benefits of some form of club management by quota owners 
gained currency.   
The Fisheries Amendment Act 1999 provided for devolution of fisheries services, 
but not management.  Importantly, it did not provide the coercive powers needed by 
stakeholders to address the issue of free-riders.  By the early 2000s industry support 
for  devolution  of  fisheries  management  was  strong  but  Government  interest  had 
lessened, a situation which remains.   
 
Outcomes (Report Card) 
This section briefly assesses the performance of the New Zealand QMS in respect of 
the expectations described above.   
Control of exploitation 
The QMS has lived up to the expectation of controlling the level of exploitation of 
fish stocks.  This is illustrated well in the inshore stocks that were causing concern 
in the period immediately prior to QMS implementation.  Figure 2 shows the catches 
of the main inshore species from 1974 to 1998.  The four species of most concern at 
the time of implementation are shown at the bottom of the graph.  During the 1970s 
catches had expanded to unsustainable levels and snapper catch in particular was 
declining under the pressure of high levels of effort.     7 
 
Data sources: King 1985; QMS data 
Figure 2 - Total catch for New Zealand inshore finfish species: 1974-1998 
Introduction of the QMS in 1986 brought the exploitation of these species quickly 
under  control,  while  allowing  effort  to  be  redirected  to  under-utilised  species. 
Aggregate  catch  for  the  inshore  was  not  reduced  overall,  but  was  effectively 
constrained on a stock by stock basis to levels estimated to be sustainable.  Annala 
(1996) reported improved biological status of fisheries after ten years of the QMS 
and, more recently, The Ministry of Fisheries (2006) reports that of the 60-70% of 
stocks for which information on stock status in available, over 80% are considered 
to be at or near target levels (Ministry of Fisheries 2006).  However, the high costs 
of obtaining good information mean that accurate assessment of stock status remains 
a challenge.  
Some issues remain unresolved however.  In particular, no clean solution has been 
discovered to the problem of by-catch of both high and low value species in trawl 
fisheries generated by single species quota allocations.  Management mechanisms 
allow for fishing to proceed despite the problems, and safeguards are in place to stop 
fishing if sustainability is believed to be threatened.  However, dealing with the 
potential mismatch between catch mixes and available quota mixes in individual 
fishing operations is the subject of ongoing work.  
Rent capture 
A benefit of transferable catching rights is the indication of profit expectations given 
by quota prices.  Prices for quota trades rose steeply in the early years of the QMS, 
with  the  total  value  of  quota  exceeding  NZ$3  billion  by  the  mid-1990s.    After 
dropping back a little values continued to rise to reach an estimated $3.7 billion by 
2004.  This relatively stable long-term capital valuation of surpluses in commercial 
fishing indicates significant rent capture.  This profitability has fuelled development 
of  the  sophistication  of  the  industry  and  some  new  high  value  fisheries,  and 
importantly allowed the industry to contribute substantially to the costs of research 
and management of the fisheries. 8 
 
The profitability of the fishery is also demonstrated by the facts that, since 1994, 
most of the costs of managing commercial fisheries have been paid by the industry 
though levies, and that, unlike fishing industries in many countries, the New Zealand 
industry receives no government subsidies. 
Allocative efficiency 
As expected, the QMS has allowed rights to flow to those who value them more 
highly.  In the inshore fisheries, large tonnages of quota changed hands in the first 
year as a result of both a government quota buyback and market trading.  Around 
25%  of  those  to  whom  quota  was  issued  sold  out  in  this  first  year.  Significant 
takeover activity seems to have occurred with large companies buying out medium 
sized  operations.    In  the  following  years  a  steady  low  rate  of  concentration  of 
catching rights has continued in most sectors (Connor 2001).  
It should be noted that concentration of catch ownership was quite high before QMS 
was introduced.  Although significant ownership restructuring has taken place since 
implementation,  the  basic  economic  character  of  the  sector  in  New  Zealand  has 
always  dictated  a  concentrated  industry  structure.    This  is  exaggerated  in  the 
deepwater fisheries which require high capital investment and are overwhelmingly 
export oriented.  The value derived from New Zealand’s fisheries is over 90% from 
exports, but in total represents less than 1% of the global trade in fish.  This means 
exporters need to be locally large – and hence few – to be able to successfully 
compete in the world market.  
By 1993 three firms held 53% of the total quota by weight, with a greater share of 
the deepwater species (60%) and less of the inshore (20%).  However, in the inshore 
fisheries 70% of quota by weight has been held by the top 5% of quota owners since 
the QMS introduction and has trended very gradually toward greater concentration 
since.  Economic pressures on the big companies in recent years have driven some 
takeover activity, but to date the largest firms have resisted the proposition to merge. 
One limitation of the early QMS was the transactions costs of quota leasing.  This 
was  addressed  in  the  implementation  of  annual  catch  entitlement  (ACE),  which 
allows the annual right to land fish to be traded independently of the quota right.  
This  has  significantly  lowered  transactions  costs  and  allowed  more  flexibility  in 
catch strategies.  
An assessment of the New Zealand ITQ system by Kerr et al (2003) concluded that, 
“In  general  the  evidence  thus  far  suggests  that  the  market  is  operating  in  a 
reasonably efficient manner and is providing significant economic gains”.  
Productive efficiency 
It  can  be  useful  to  consider  the  affects  of  institutional  change  on  the  physical 
attributes  of  the  production  chain  independently  of  allocation,  despite  the  strong 
linkages.  An important expectation of quota management concerns rationalisation 
of fleet capacity to reduce the costs of fishing.  Despite the significant restructuring 
of quota ownership following implementation of the QMS, the capacity of the core 
fleet of inshore vessels has stayed remarkably constant over along period.  Several 
factors are worth mentioning.     9 
First, when catches of stressed stocks were reduced on introduction of quota, TACs 
for  under-utilised  stocks  were  set  at  levels  above  then  current  catches.    This 
provided  one  avenue  for  redeployment  of  displaced  effort.    Another  was  the 
expansion of domestic fishing of mid-depth fisheries such as hoki, hake, barracouta, 
and ling, which could be pursued by the larger vessels in the inshore fleet.  Although 
this  has  not  been  investigated  in  depth,  the  adjustments  in  targeting  and 
redeployment of the fleet enabled by secure rights and quota trading probably meant 
that the surplus capacity believed to be present in the inshore fisheries in the early 
1980s was mostly put to useful work within the new catch limits.   
The impact of the QMS on small vessels was pre-empted to some extent by a 1983 
policy that excluded part time fishers from renewing their licences.  This cut the 
under-12 metre fleet by about 50% or over 2000 boats, mainly from the bottom end 
of  the  size  range.    Following  the  QMS  introduction  the  capacity  in  this  sector 
contracted further due to exits of some larger vessels, but overall numbers increased 
as very small boats came back into the fisheries.  
Although many small and medium vessels have exited, for the first decade of the 
QMS, these were mostly replaced in capacity terms by new vessel construction, with 
a trend towards larger vessels within each size class.  Small vessels continued their 
resurgence  into  the  early  1990s,  but  declined  again,  as  did  all  inshore  classes, 
following the introduction of management cost-recovery in 1994.  There is some 
evidence that some medium sized inshore vessels have been locked into the fisheries 
with no alternative use, but the last decade has seen these coming to the end of their 
serviceable life.  Again some of the capacity has been replaced by larger vessels so 
numbers have declined more than total capacity of the fleet.  These changes are 
shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 – Long term NZ inshore fleet capacity outcomes 







































The QMS, and the trial deepwater quota system from 1983 to 1986, undoubtedly 
assisted  in  the  “New  Zealandisation”  of  the  deepwater  fisheries  previously 
dominated by foreign fleets.  This process transformed the New Zealand fishing 
industry from a bit player in the economy and taking only 10% of the catch from the 
zone,  to  a  major  contributor  to  GNP  and  regional  employment  within  10  years.  
Fishing now ranks in the top five export industries contributing in the region of $1.4 
billion in receipts annually, and directly employs some 10,000 people (Ministry of 
Fisheries, 2006).  The industry has invested substantially in processing and adding 
value to basic product, as well as in the development of aquaculture.   
The  QMS  precipitated  Maori  claims  for  a  share  of  fisheries  resources  but  also 
provided the mechanism by which these claims were settled.  Maori interests in 
commercial fisheries have grown to the point that they now own about 40% of all 
quota shares.   
Although not solely responsible for this success, there is no doubt that through the 
security  provided  by  quota  ownership,  rent  capture  through  effective  control  of 
effort,  and  efficiencies  promoted  by  quota  markets,  the  QMS  has  enabled  the 
achievement of this potential 
Stewardship and the devolution of management 
The nature of common pool resources dictates that, if incentives for stewardship 
among  fishers  are  strong,  it  is  likely  that  these  could  only  find  full  satisfaction 
through coordinated action among a majority of participants.  Given such drive, 
together with the ability to coordinate across stakeholders, it seems plausible that 
representative organisations might do at least as good a job at management of the 
fishery as government officials.  But it seems these are difficult conditions to satisfy. 
That  property  rights  in  the  catch  would  engender  a  universal  conservation  or 
stewardship ethic in an industry hither to prosecuted as a free-for-all at the frontier, 
was perhaps an overly ambitious hope.  Nevertheless, there is some evidence of 
incentives  within  the  system  great  enough  to  promote  an  active  approach  to 
stewardship in specific circumstances.   
Over the twenty years of the QMS there has been a great deal of research in the area 
of incentives for cooperative behaviour, both theoretical and empirical.  We now 
understand  more  clearly  the  institutional  requirements  for  the  pursuit  of  joint 
interests, and can see how the success stories in this regard within the QMS have 
come about. 
Where relatively small numbers of quota owners are involved, returns and quota 
values are high, and stocks are known to respond quickly to management change, 
such  as  in  the  rock  lobster  fisheries,  examples  of  cooperative  stewardship  of 
resources have emerged.  An example is the measures taken to rebuild the Gisborne 
Rock Lobster Fishery in the 1990s (Breen and Kendrick, 1997).  Other examples of 
concerted action for conservation have occurred where it has become clear that the 
alternative of government regulation was looming.  Examples include management 
of seabird bycatch in various fisheries, and the development of a multi-stakeholder 
plan  for  management  of  marine  activities  in  Fiordland.    However,  examples  of     11 
effective and durable arrangements without the sanction and significant support of 
government are rare. 
In  many  fisheries,  stewardship  is  perhaps  better  characterised  as  passive.    The 
security of share and control of overall take provided by the QMS allow individual 
fishers to plan their harvesting more carefully and has largely neutralised the race 
for fish.  Although it is the system that provides the conditions, it is fishers that are 
generally accepting of the system and catch limits, and that obey the rules because 
they can see that by doing so everyone benefits.  Still, conditions in many fisheries 
are such that cheating does occur, at the expense of those that obey the rules and of 
the fishery itself.   
It seems that coordinated active stewardship by fisheries stakeholders requires more 
than the basic quota system and its individualised rights.  Ideals such as Coasian 
bargains  between  rights  holders  and  enforceable  private  contracts  have  not 
eventuated under the prevailing conditions.  Meanwhile the bar has been raised in 
the  judgement  of  stewardship,  as  the  care  taken  to  protect  resources  and 
environment from damaging impacts and to nurture and restore resource systems for 
the  benefit  of  future  as  well  as  current  generations.    Social  values  for  the 
environment have changed significantly over the past two decades, and public and 
political  sensitivity  has  increased.    Non-commercial  extractive  interests  are  also 
more prominent, with the establishment of Maori customary fishing as an important 
consideration along with the diverse amateur fishing sector.  So, not only are the 
issues more complicated, there are more views and represented interests to reconcile 
in the management of fisheries. 
It seems further institutional development is required to lower transactions costs of 
collective  action,  and  to  ensure  the  re-valued  public  interest  in  the  natural 
environment is fully represented, along with those of other extractive users.  For the 
past five years or so the Ministry has been considering these issues under the broad 
rubric of Fisheries Plans and Objectives-Based Management.  The concept of what a 
fisheries plan might comprise and how it might be developed and administered has 
evolved as the discussion internally and with stakeholders has advanced.  Over the 
past year or so the Objectives-Based Management framework has firmed up and is 
now being implemented.  The remainder of this paper sets out the vision for this 




The ITQ system and the wide range of other management tools provided in the 
Fisheries  Act  gives  New  Zealand  fishery  managers  arguably  one  of  the  most 
powerful sets of fishery management measures available anywhere.  The Act also 
provides for development of fisheries plans although, consistent with its desire for 
stakeholders to take increased responsibility for managing fisheries, the Ministry 
has, to date, chosen not to prepare fisheries plans, preferring stakeholders to do this.  
Stakeholders have developed plans for only a few fisheries.   12 
The degree to which Government’s intentions for fisheries are specified is limited to 
the  purpose  and  principles  of  the  Act  and  a  specific  fish  stock  management 
threshold.   
•  The Purpose of the Act is to provide for the utilisation of fisheries resources 
while ensuring sustainability.   
•  Environmental  principles  address  the  need  to  maintain  associated  and 
dependent species above a level that ensures long-term viability, maintain 
biological diversity, and protect habitat of particular significance for fisheries 
management.   
•  Information principles give effect to the precautionary approach, requiring 
decision-makers to use best available information, consider uncertainty, be 
cautious when information is poor, and not use lack of good information as a 
reason to defer making a decision. 
•  The biomass that produces the Maximum Sustainable Yield is the default 
stock threshold for species managed in the ITQ system. 
For most fisheries there are no specific plans or fishery-specific objectives.    This 
makes it difficult to determine how the suite of available management tools should 
be used in each fishery and what research and other management services should be 
undertaken.    It  also  results  in  uncertainty  for  stakeholders  about  how  the 
Government will respond to any fishery management issue.  With only high-level 
Government intentions clearly stated, stakeholders can only infer likely responses 
from  an  assessment  of  responses  to  previous  issues.    This  results  in  inefficient 
interactions between stakeholders and Government as high level generic issues are 
debated each time operational decisions must be made. 
Objectives-based  management  is  intended  to  fill  these  gaps  and  help  ensure  the 
available fishery management tools and the research and other services purchased 
for particular fisheries are clearly directed at achieving fishery-specific objectives. 
Overview 
At its simplest, objectives-based fisheries management is being clear about what we 
want to achieve through management, and designing management of a fishery to 
meet those objectives efficiently.  In practice, what we want to achieve must include 
both  Government  requirements  reflecting  national  interests,  and  stakeholder 
preferences.    In  the  system  under  development,  Government  requirements  are 
described  in  terms  of  Outcomes  and  Standards.    Stakeholder  preferences  are 
described in terms of Goals.   
The different components of the objectives-based management approach are shown 
in Figure 4 and described in the following sections.   
It  is  expected  that  managing  fisheries  to  achieve  clearly  defined  objectives  will 
result in significant improvements, including: 
•  Increased transparency in how and why fisheries are managed 
•  Improved tangata whenua and stakeholder understanding, input and buy-in to 
the process of fisheries management 
•  Easier decision-making      13 
•  A stronger link between objectives and management by better integrating 
science, policy, compliance, and other services  
•  Increased likelihood that government obligations will be met and the benefits 





   












Figure 4 – Overview of Objectives-based Fisheries Management 
Outcomes 
Outcomes are used to describe, at a high level, the results that the Ministry believes 
are required, and that it intends to achieve, through fisheries management policies 
and interventions.  Outcomes will be informed by and derived from a number of 
sources  including  legislation,  national  policy  statements,  and  international 
obligations.  They are of broad scope, and will usually be achieved over the long-
term. Outcomes are not specific to particular fish stocks, but are intended to guide 
the  development  of  more  detailed  strategies  and  policies,  particularly  fisheries 
standards. 
At the highest level, the Ministry has adopted a single outcome towards which all 









































































The value New Zealanders obtain through the sustainable use of 








The value New Zealanders obtain from the sustainable use of fisheries and 
protection of the aquatic environment is maximised. 
 
In this single outcome, value includes the full range of values obtained by different 
stakeholders  from  fisheries  and  the  interaction  of  fisheries  with  the  aquatic 
environment.  It is described in more detail through the three contributing outcomes 
that have been adopted by the Ministry: 
•  The health of the aquatic environment is protected 
•  People are able to realise best value from the sustainable and efficient use of 
fisheries 
•  Credible fisheries management 
These  three  contributing  outcomes  will  be  further  described  by  a  series  of 
increasingly specific levels of outcomes.  The lowest level of outcomes will become 
standards  that  can  be  applied  in  management  of  particular  fisheries  and  against 
which performance can be assessed.  
Standards 
The use of formal standards is increasing in fisheries management and in other areas 
such as air and water quality.  In fisheries management standards are used both by 
governments  (e.g.,  US  National  Fisheries  Standards  established  under  the 
Magnuson-Stevens  Act)  and  independent  certification  agencies  (e.g.,  Marine 
Stewardship Council Principles and Criteria). 
In the New Zealand fisheries context a standard describes the minimum performance 
considered necessary for fishery outcomes to be achieved.  Standards will generally 
be used to describe the required management results applicable to specific fisheries 
or  other  management  units.    Standards  set  out  minimum  levels  of  performance 
expected  from  a  fishery.    They  do  not  preclude  managers  aiming  for  a  higher 
standard.    Standards  may  be  set  for  ecosystems  and  fisheries,  as  well  as  for 
management  activities.  They  may  be  expressed  a  qualitative  description,  or  a 
number, or criteria to determine how a numerical value will be arrived at.  Over 
time, standards will cover all the necessary components of management required to 
ensure that fisheries outcomes are met.   
Two  types  of  standards  will  be  developed:  process  standards  and  performance 
standards.  Process standards will define the quality of administrative performance 
that must be achieved.  Examples include consultation requirements and reporting 
requirements.  Performance standards define the minimum levels of performance in 
respect of specified components of ecosystems such as fish stock size and habitat 
structure, and the use of fisheries resources, including allocation between fisheries 
sectors. 
Fisheries plans 
Fisheries plans are the main planning tool that will be used to implement objectives-
based management for specific fisheries. The primary purpose of a fisheries plan is 
to set out clear linkages between the objectives set for a fishery and the management 
measures and services used to achieve those objectives.   
The Ministry intends initially to develop around 26 fisheries plans covering New 
Zealand’s fisheries. Over time, these plans will be the primary mechanism for the     15 
Ministry  and  stakeholders  to  collaborate  on  the  management  of  fisheries.  Each 
fisheries plan will cover a number of fisheries grouped primarily on the basis of 
similar species and/or geographic areas.  It will cover the activities of all sectors 
involved in  the relevant  fisheries.   Each  plan will  contain  the  elements  outlined 
below. 
Goals  are  statements  of  how  different  stakeholders  can  obtain  best  value 
from a fishery.  Examples include maximising long-term economic return, 
and  maximising  the  catch  rate  for  the  recreational  sector.    Goals  are 
aspirational  in  nature  and  cannot  all  be  achieved  simultaneously  in  a 
particular fishery.  Goals are deliberately high level, and are not used to 
determine specific actions – instead, they establish the broad direction. 
Objectives are specific management results designed to achieve goals while 
meeting  relevant  standards.    Objectives  must  all  be  able  to  be  achieved 
simultaneously, so trade-offs between goals are required when determining 
objectives  for  a  particular  fishery.    Objectives  provide  the  basis  for 
management measures, services, and monitoring. 
Management  measures  are  the  rules  that  are  implemented  to  meet 
objectives.  Each objective has a series of measures designed to meet the 
objective,  grouped  together  as  a  strategy.    These  may  include  research 
projects, regulations, codes of practice, and decision rules etc.   
Services are those things that must occur to implement the measure (e.g., 
staff time required to develop a code of practice or analyse results). 
Monitoring  is  the  reporting  systems  implemented  in  a  fishery  to  ensure 
measures are carried out and objectives are being met.  Each fisheries plan 
will need to detail how performance against standards will be monitored.  
Consistent with earlier attempts to encourage increased stakeholder responsibility, 
stakeholders are encouraged to identify their goals for the fishery and, as far as 
practicable,  work  with  the  Ministry  and  other  stakeholders  to  determine  agreed 
objectives, management measures, and services.  The Ministry will provide overall 
coordination for all plans.    
Progress to Date 
Good progress is being made implementing Objectives-Based Management.  Key 
milestones in 2006 included completion of three “proof of concept” fisheries plans 
for  the  Foveaux  Strait  Oyster,  Southern  Blue  Whiting,  and  Coromandel  Scallop 
Fisheries, development of a new information system, and consultation on the first 
fisheries standards, including the important harvest strategy standard. 
Twenty-six plans describing current management of all New Zealand fisheries are 
scheduled for completion by mid-2007.  These, and the fisheries standards, will be 
used  as  the  starting  point  for  the  Ministry  and  stakeholders  to  develop  new 
objectives-based plans for all fisheries over the next five years.  16 
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